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Plans   for   this   special   issue   of   ERRS,   which   is   devoted   to   “Ricœur   and   Analytic  
Philosophy,”  were   initially   devised   after   the   international   conference   that  was   held   in   Paris   in  
November   2013   to   mark   the   centenary   of   the   birth   of   the   philosopher.   (This   conference   was  
jointly  organized  by  Olivier  Abel,   Jean-­‐‑Marc  Tétaz  and   Johann  Michel.)  While   there  has  been  a  
genuine  enthusiasm  for  studies  devoted  to  Ricœurian  thought  over  the  past  twenty  years  or  so,  
there   is   clearly   a   relative   dearth   of   secondary   literature   on   the   significance   that   analytic  
philosophy  holds   for  Ricœur’s  work.   It  was   in  order   to   fill   this  gap   that   Jean-­‐‑Marc  Tétaz  and   I  
devised   the   thematic  of   the  colloquium,  held  at   the  Fonds  Ricœur   in  2013,  and   then  developed  
the  theme  of  this  issue.  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  the  call  for  proposals  for  the  Centenary  
colloquium  was  more  broadly  concerned  with  Ricœur’s  links  to  contemporary  philosophy  in  the  
English  language.  
It  would  certainly  be  a  mistake  to  consider  Ricœur  an  “analytic  philosopher,”  given  that  
he  is  seldom  discussed  by  philosophers  who  would  describe  themselves  in  that  way  nor  did  he  
ever  claim  that  this  label  applied  to  him.  But  one  should  not  forget  that  he  had  taken  an  interest  
in  analytic  authors  even  before  his   long  sojourn  at  the  University  of  Chicago,  (and  had  done  so  
sometime   prior   to   the   beginning   of   the   1960’s).   He   also   helped   introduce   those   authors   to   a  
French  audience,  particularly   in  his  “rue  Parmentier  Seminar”  and   in  his  role  as  director  of   the  
collection  L’ordre  philosophique  with  Éditions  du  Seuil.  Then,  especially  from  the  1970’s  onwards,  
he   did   for   analytic   philosophy   what   he   had   done   for   phenomenology   several   decades   earlier  
(following   on   from   Levinas   and   Sartre):   he   took   up   the   task   of   transmitting   it   and   initiating  
discussion  around  it.  This  undeniable  gesture  of  openness,  is  all  the  more  remarkable  given  that  
the   analytic   traditions   had   been   largely   formed   in   opposition   to   a   philosophical   method—
phenomenology—which  contributed  more  than  any  other  to  Ricœur’s  early  formation.  
However,   Ricœur   was   not   content   with   introducing   and   providing   a   commentary   on  
authors   of   the   analytic   tradition   in   his   teaching;   he   integrated   them   at   the   pivotal   point   of   his  
work’s  hermeneutic  turn,  that  is  to  say  when  the  question  of  language  became  the  central  motif  of  
his   thought,  particularly  after  his  confrontation  with  structuralism.  It  would  be  simplistic,   then,  
to   confine   Ricœur’s   interest   in   analytic   philosophy   to   a   single   phenomenological   perspective,  
even  if  he  was  one  of  the  first  to  attempt  a  dialogue  between  these  two  paradigms  of  philosophy,  
only  traces  of  which  are  to  be  found  in  “The  Semantics  of  Action”  (the  outcome  of  his  seminar  at  
the  Sorbonne).  It  is  certainly  difficult  to  consider  the  analytic  philosophy  in  his  work  as  a  “graft”  
similar  in  nature  to  the  “graft”  of  hermeneutics  on  phenomenology.  But  it  is  undeniable  that  the  
introduction   of   the   analytic   paradigm   harmonizes   well   with   the   “philosophy   of   the   detour,”  
which  has  to  be  the  signature  of  Ricœur’s  philosophy.  
In  addition  to  the  preliminary  discussions  found  in  “The  Semantics  of  Action,”  it  is  really  
in  four  essential  works  that  Ricœur  is  seen  to  practise  this  “philosophy  of  the  detour”  through  the  
analyses  of  action  and  language  proposed  by  the  analytic  movement:  The  Rule  of  Metaphor,  From  
Text  to  Action,  the  first  volume  of  Time  and  Narrative  and,  of  course,  Oneself  as  Another.  In  The  Rule  
of  Metaphor  Ricœur   turns   to  analytic  philosophy  for  help   in  clarifying   the  problem  of  reference.  
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Ricœur  it  is  a  matter  of  finding,  in  this  movement  of  thought,  the  means  to  capture  the  semantic  
dimension  of  language,  and  more  specifically  the  semantic  dimension  of  metaphorical  language.  
In  Time  and  Narrative,  American  analytic  philosophers   (Dray,  Danto,  von  Wright,  Mink,  
Gallie,   etc.)   play   a   vital   role   in   the   construction   of   a   narrative   model   of   historiography.   The  
arrangement   that   Ricœur   adopts   sees   the   Annales   School   directly   compared  with   positivism’s  
(i.e.,  Hempel’s)  nomological  model.  The  latter  is  then  contrasted,  in  turn,  with  the  theses  of  Dray,  
von   Wright,   Danto,   Gallie   and   Mink,   thus   permitting   the   reconstruction   of   the   thesis   of   the  
narrative  character  of  history  on  a  new  foundation.  Ricœur’s  wager  that   these  traditions  can  be  
linked   together   merits   being   questioned   both   from   an   epistemological   viewpoint   (the  
composition  of  a  historical  science)  and  from  an  ontological  viewpoint  (the  reconstruction  of  the  
being  of  the  having  been).  
In  From  Text   to  Action   and  Oneself   as  Another   Ricœur   enters   a   debate  with   the   analytic  
philosophy   of   action   that   he   had   opened   up   in   the   1970’s:   semantics   (Strawson),   pragmatics  
(Austin  and  Searle),   and   the   theory  of  action   (Kenny,  Wright,  Anscombe,  and  Davidson).  How  
does  Ricoeur  analyse   these  authors?  How  does  he   link   the  phenomenology  of   the  owned  body  
and  the  analytic  philosophy  of  action?  
It   is   to   all   of   these   questions   that   the   current   issue   of   ERRS   attempts   to   respond,  
particularly  those  that  directly  relate  to  the  philosophy  of  language  and  of  action.  The  issue  starts  
with  an  article  of  Ricœur’s  (whose  publication  has  been  authorized  by  the  editorial  committee  of  
the   Fonds   Ricœur)—in   its   French   and   English   versions—on  Wittgenstein   and   Husserl   on   the  
subject   of   language.   This   text   shows   the   philosopher’s   early   interest   (from   the   middle   of   the  
1960’s)  in  attempting  a  dialogue  between  the  two  traditions.  
In   his   contribution   (Langage,   imagination,   et   référence.   Ricœur   lecteur   de   Wittgenstein   et  
Goodman),   Samuel   Lelièvre   offers   a   detailed   analysis   of   the   confrontation   that   our   philosopher  
sets  up   in   that  article  at   the  same   time  as  he   re-­‐‑examines   the  Ricœurian   reading  of  Goodman’s  
general  theory  of  reference,  having  taken  The  Rule  of  Metaphor  as  a  guiding  thread.  Lelièvre  is  co-­‐‑
editor  with  Catherine  Goldenstein  of   the  article  by  Ricœur   that  we  are  publishing   in   this   issue.  
Jean-­‐‑Marc  Tétaz  takes  the  same  work  as  the  theme  of  his  reflection  (La  métaphore  entre  sémantique  
et  ontologie.  La  réception  de  la  philosophie  analytique  du  langage  dans  l’herméneutique  de  Paul  Ricœur),  
dwelling  upon  the  role  played  by  analytic  philosophy  in  the  Ricœurian  meditations  on  language  
and  the  poetic  or  literary  text.  This  choice  is  justified  historically  insofar  as  these  are  issues  related  
to  the  language  and  interpretation  of  texts,  to  which  Ricœur’s  debate  with  analytic  philosophy  is  
committed.  
It   is   in   support   of   another   still   unpublished   textual   corpus   (Lectures   on   Imagination  
delivered   at   the   University   of   Chicago   in   1975)   that   Jean-­‐‑Luc   Amalric   sets   out   to   analyse   the  
meaning  and  the  implications  of  the  comparative  interpretation  of  Sartre’s  and  Ryle’s  theses  on  
the   imagination,  which  Ricœur   conducted.   This   comparison,  which   focuses   on   the   question   of  
image   production,   is   an   opportunity   to   show   the   convergences   and   divergences,   which   are  
played  out  between  a  philosopher  of  the  analytic  tradition  and  a  philosopher  of  the  continental  
tradition.   Linda   Cox’s   article   (The   Convergence   of   Ricœur’s   and   von   Wright’s   Complex   Models   of  
History)   does   justice   to   the   historical   epistemology,   inspired   by   analytic   philosophy,   that   runs  
through  Time   and  Narrative.   She   tries   to   show  more  precisely  where   a   constructive   conjunction  
occurs   between   von  Wright’s   theses   and   the   synthesis   between   explanation   and  narration   that  
Ricœur  calls  for.  
As  the  title  of  his  article  indicates,  David  Pellauer’s  contribution  (Ricœur’s  Own  Linguistic  
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linguistic  turn”  in  Ricœur’s  work,  an  expression  that  is  generally  used  in  connection  with  authors  
within  the  analytic  tradition  or  those  influenced  by  that  tradition.  What  is  essentially  at   issue  is  
knowing  whether  all  philosophical  problems  are  ultimately   reducible   to  questions  of   language.  
David  Pellauer’s  article  has  to  be  seen  as  a  counterpoint  to  Pascal  Engel’s  contribution  (Y  a-­‐‑t-­‐‑il  eu  
vraiment   une   rencontre   entre   Ricœur   et   la   philosophie   analytique?),   which   whilst   it   acknowledges  
Ricœur’s  undeniable  merit  as  someone  who  introduced  the  analytic  tradition  into  France,  doubts  
that  there  really  has  been  “an  encounter”  with  this  tradition,  and  suggests  that,  at  most,  there  has  
been  an  attempt  at  dialogue.  
The   last   two   contributions,   those   of   Jean-­‐‑Luc   Petit   (Ricœur   et   la   théorie   de   l’action)   and  
Vincent  Descombes’  objections  to  it  are  focused  on  the  analytic  semantics  of  action  especially  in  
line  with   the  Ricœurian  phenomenology  of   the  will.  One   of   the  problems   is   to   know  whether,  
even   before   Ricœur’s   supposed   linguistic   turn,   the   phenomenology   of   the  will  was   already   in  
search  of  a  philosophy  of  ordinary  language.  
I  want  to  thank  Jean-­‐‑Marc  Tétaz  who  contributed  to  the  initial  development  of  this  issue,  
Eileen  Brennan  who  actively  collaborated  in   its  production  and  Guillaume  Braunstein,  our  new  
sub-­‐‑editor,  for  the  work  he  has  done,  editing,  correcting  and  formatting  the  texts.  
  
Johann  Michel  
(translated  by  Eileen  Brennan)  
